作者:沈宇哲

原标题:中华民国扫除党禁最后一道障碍

中华民国司法院大法官会议6月20日作出具有里程碑意义的释宪文。大法官认为，中华民国《人民团体法》第二条中“人民团体之组织与活动，不得主张共产主义，或主张分裂国土”之规定将成为主管机关审查人民政治言论内容的保护伞，其立法主旨与《中华民国宪法》保障人民结社自由和言论自由权利不合，裁定该法违宪，应自释宪文公布之日起失效。

一、大法官攻克党禁最后一关

司法院大法官会议会有如此裁决，一切得从1998年说起。那一年，蒋介石的文胆陈布雷之孙陈师孟向台北市社会局申请成立“台北市外省人台湾独立促进会”，以“支持以和平方式，推动台湾独立建国”为宗旨，结果遭社会局认定与《人民团体法》规定不符驳回申请，陈师孟不服，提起行政诉讼，后经台湾最高行政法院终审判决陈师孟败诉。这才有了向司法院申请大法官解释宪法，运用下位法涉嫌抵触中华民国最高法律的途径进行抗辩。经过十年漫长等待，大法官的一锤定音为中华民国民主宪政再立一块丰碑。

其实，1998年司法院大法官会议已经对一部重要法律的违宪争议作出过裁定，当初大法官对国民党政府制定的《集会游行法》中授权执政者可以事前对集会、游行之政治言论进行审查，并对《集会游行法》中“不得主张共产主义或分裂国土”裁定违宪。由于当时仍是国民党执政，大法官的释宪判决突破了解除戒严后的重大政治禁忌。如果说，十年前大法官摘除了游行示威者的“违法”标签，那十年后的今天，大法官的释宪宣告中华民国境内自此可以成立共产主义政党，并从宪法的高度消除台独等一切主张国土分裂政党的政治壁垒。

不但主张台独之政治团体可以正大光明的成立，就连金门、马祖、澎湖或其他本岛县市要求脱离中华民国自行独立也在被宪法许可的范围内，但暴力和恐怖组织除外。这是自蒋经国解除党禁、报禁之后又一重大宪政举措，并从根本上废除执政者钳制人民政治言论，保障公民结社自由的权力基础。

二、威权时代匪谍、台独重则死刑

蒋氏父子长期奉行“反共又反独”的铁腕政策，党国体制下臭名昭著的《动员戡乱时期临时条款》和《戡乱时期检肃匪谍条例》在白色恐怖年代为国民党政权残忍镇压，巩固统治地位起到了举足轻重的作用，并一度超越《中华民国宪法》成为威权时代压制人民思想，情报特务系统制造冤狱的重要法律基石。这其中，疑似共匪的外省人一律处决，走向台独道路的本省人采取流放国外等柔性镇压措施分而治之。

现任行政院长刘兆玄也曾坚决抵制过国民党政权借查禁台独之名，钳制言论自由。1991年5月1日李登辉政府宣布终止“动员勘乱时期”，但只过了八天，法务部调查局在国立清华大学侦破史明独立台湾会在台组织，逮捕“独台会”骨干，指控该组织预谋在台湾发动武装革命。时任清华大学校长的刘兆玄虽反对台独，但基于保护学生言论自由及抗议调查局擅自闯入大学校园抓人的粗暴行动的立场，与调查局进行抗争。事件最终在5月15日酿成全台许多高等学府宣布罢课，大学生们汇聚于台北车站静坐抗议。5月17日立法院通过废除惩治叛乱条例，“独台会”骨干获得交保；1991年5月20日，知识界、社运界与民进党发动万人游行抗议，要求军警特退出校园；同年5月24日，与惩治叛乱条例有关的检肃匪谍条例也被废除。

“独台会”案最终以1992年5月立法院修正《中华民国刑法》第一百条，删除阴谋叛乱罪处罚，在法律上彻底落实思想自由、学术自由与言论自由收场。 (more…)

这句话将成为名言，至少在500年内都将成为是名言。将成为和林肯的“民有、民治、民享”、马丁路德金的“我有一个梦”、法国大革命的“民主、自由、博爱”等等一样，标识出人类理性的光芒。

这句话属于现年28岁的尼泊尔旺楚克王朝国王——吉格梅·凯萨尔·纳姆耶尔·旺楚克。

老国王辛格（右）与继位人凯萨尔（左）在一起

这句话不只是适合一个国家，也适合一个企业、一个家族、或者团队、或者项目组，或者为人处世。

一个好的制度是尊重每个人的，充分调动和发挥每个人能量的，让每个人都有自己的选择权，并尊重每个人的价值取向。

大家强才是真的强，国王强，那只是国王自己的事。

一个现代权力者应当认识到，不是个人或集团最大，而是公众最大，没有任何一个权威或政府可以无条件统治别人而永远不会受到质疑。专制必然要依靠人治，依靠权威，只有民主才能保证法治，保证人民的选择，即用选票来选择自己的生活，因此民主制度比任何明君政治都更能达到长治久安。

民主，就是被统治者授权统治者有权进行统治。 (more…)

小马哥成功当选中华民国在台澎金马地区的领导人了，激烈的大选之后，他和竞选对手谢长廷分别发表了演说。全文录取如下，不做太多评论。

只说一句：感谢两党为华人社会的民主制度的建立进行了激烈的、平和的、有益的探索。

马英九当选宣言:从感恩出发、从谦卑做起

萧副总统当选人、连荣誉主席、吴主席、王院长、各位副主席、竞选总部同仁，以及在场及全国各地的民众，大家好！

现在我向大家宣布，刚才开票统计的结果，我与萧万长先生已经获得台湾多数选民的支持，当选中华民国第十二任总统、副总统。

我要强调，这次选举的结果，并不是马萧个人的胜利，也不是一个政党的胜利，而是千千万万“希望求新、求变”台湾人民的胜利；也是反对台湾继续锁国，希望开放，与世界接轨的一大胜利。更是台湾民主政治又一次的胜利。

台湾人民的心声，在这次选举结果已经反映出来：

人民希望政府清廉，不要贪腐：
人民希望经济繁荣，不要萧条；
人民希望政治安定，不要内斗；
人民希望族群和谐，不要撕裂；
人民希望两岸和平，不要战争。

过去一年，从南到北、上山下乡的走访过程中，我能体会，台湾人民的期待其实非常单纯：他们希望能过好的生活、能有和谐的社会、能找回台湾人传统的价值、能让台湾在国际社会上得到肯定。台湾人民对于政治开始厌烦、对于蓝绿吐不完的口水感到无奈；但人民却共同希望王建民能胜投、詹咏然与庄佳容能夺冠、中华棒球队能参加奥运、李安能拿奥斯卡。台湾人民并不奢求大富大贵，但却也不希望过苦日子。台湾人民政治观点也许不尽相同，甚至会彼此指责，但是大家都同意，目前原地踏步的情况一定要改变；再这样内耗空转下去，绝对不是办法。台湾人民了解：“改变，我们才有希望。”

人民的心声，我们都听到了，国民党必须完全执政，才能完全负责。我们执政后，一定优先拼经济，改善人民的生活；并以最诚恳、最负责的态度，立即推动各项改革，落实选举承诺，以回应人民的改变期待。

选举结束是承担的开始，我们深信唯有改革，才能带来改变；唯有改变，台湾才有希望！

我也要向我的竞选对手，谢长廷先生、苏贞昌先生与他们的团队和支持者致意，民进党对台湾的民主曾做出不可磨灭的贡献，现在与未来仍必然是台湾民主稳定发展，不可或缺的力量。这一段期间，我们虽然相互竞争、相互也有一些批评，但我们透过民主改革共同推动台湾向前进步，我们共同完成了台湾民主政治又一次的胜利。民主自由是台湾人共享最珍贵的资产，也是台湾价值最核心的部分，我一定会好好的珍惜它、坚决的捍卫它。

我在此承诺，我们执政后，一定虚心地努力争取民进党的合作，共同为人民的福祉、台湾的前途打拼。谢长廷先生选举期间发表的若干政见，我们也会在未来纳入施政考量。

我认为倾听人民的声音、尊重在野党与媒体、不干预独立机关运作，以及扶持社会中间力量，是推动阳光政治、维持多元制衡，必须要有的基础，我保证上任后将身体力行，积极推动上述工作，促使台湾民主恢复常态，蓬勃发展。

选举是一时的，人民的福祉、台湾的利益则是永久的。选举或许有蓝绿之分，但选完之后，执政就不能有“你我”之别，我们所有人都在一条船上，大家是命运共同体，必须携手合作。

我向大家保证，执政后的国民党，一定从感恩出发，从谦卑做起，努力倾听人民的心声，关心人民的苦乐，勇敢地反省检讨。只要是生活在这块土地上的人民，都是我们的头家，服务的对象。身为总统，我将以行动体现正直善良的台湾核心价值，让台湾这个母亲包容来自每一个地方的孩子，大家互相支援、共同生活，走向美好的未来。

政党和平竞争、和平轮替，台湾人民将是永远的胜利者。 (more…)

星期三,美国国会就古狗.雅虎等公司与中国政府的合作举行听证会, 讨论中国网络言论自由问题.
美国政府日前宣布成立全球互联网信息自由工作组,帮助美国网络科技公司在类似中国的国家或地区经营时捍卫当地网络言论自由.
以下为Google的申诉全文.

Posted by Karen Wickre, Google Blog team

At today’s hearing before the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives, we provided the following testimony:

Testimony of Google Inc. before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations

Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives
February 15, 2006

Elliot Schrage
Vice President, Global Communications
and Public Affairs, Google Inc.

My name is Elliot Schrage and I am the vice president for global communications and public affairs at Google. My role is to help shape and explain the decisions Google makes as a company in its efforts to provide global access to information as quickly, conveniently, usefully, and comprehensively as possible.

I’m here today to answer any and all questions you might have about how we are attempting to do business in China. I certainly don’t – my colleagues certainly don’t – expect everyone to agree with our decision to launch a new service inside this challenging, complex, promising market. I hope my testimony will help explain how we came to our decision, what we’re seeking to accomplish, and how we’re seeking to accomplish it.

Introduction
At the outset, I want to acknowledge what I hope is obvious: Figuring out how to deal with China has been a difficult exercise for Google. The requirements of doing business in China include self-censorship – something that runs counter to Google’s most basic values and commitments as a company. Despite that, we made a decision to launch a new product for China – Google.cn – that respects the content restrictions imposed by Chinese laws and regulations. Understandably, many are puzzled or upset by our decision. But our decision was based on a judgment that Google.cn will make a meaningful – though imperfect – contribution to the overall expansion of access to information in China.

Until a few weeks ago, Google has been serving Chinese Internet users the same way we serve all Internet users worldwide since the company was founded in 1999. Though we had no operations or employees in China, we were able to provide a Chinese-language version of Google.com that, thanks to the global nature of the Internet, could easily be reached by users inside China. In 2002, we started to learn that Google was sporadically unavailable to Chinese users. In the fall of that year, we awoke one morning to emails from Google users in China informing us that our service was completely unavailable. We faced a choice at that point: hold fast to our commitment to free speech (and risk a long-term cut-off from our Chinese users), or compromise our principles by entering the Chinese market directly and subjecting ourselves to Chinese laws and regulations. We stood by our principles, which turned out to be a good choice, as access to Google.com was largely restored within about two weeks.

However, we soon discovered new problems. Many queries, especially politically sensitive queries, were not making it through to Google’s servers. And access became often slow and unreliable, meaning that our service in China was not something we felt proud of. Even though we weren’t doing any self-censorship, our results were being filtered anyway, and our service was being actively degraded on top of that. Indeed, at some times users were even being redirected to local Chinese search engines Nevertheless, we continued to offer our service from outside China while other Internet companies were entering China and building operations there.

A bit more than a year ago, we decided to take a serious look at China and re-assess whether our approach there was the best strategy. We spent a lot of time talking to Chinese Internet experts and users, scholars and academics inside and outside China, respected “China hands,” human rights groups and activists, government officials, business leaders, as well as our own Chinese employees. From those discussions, we reached the conclusion that perhaps we had been taking the wrong path. Our search results were being filtered; our service was being crippled; our users were flocking to local Chinese alternatives; and, ultimately, Chinese Internet users had less access to information than they would have had.

Let me dig a bit deeper into the analytic framework we developed for China. Google’s objective is to make the world’s information accessible to everyone, everywhere, all the time. It is a mission that expresses two fundamental commitments:

(a) First, our business commitment to satisfy the interests of users, and by doing so to build a leading company in a highly competitive industry; and

(b) Second, our policy conviction that expanding access to information to anyone who wants it will make our world a better, more informed, and freer place.

Some governments impose restrictions that make our mission difficult to achieve, and this is what we have encountered in China. In such a situation, we have to add to the balance a third fundamental commitment:

(c) Be responsive to local conditions.

So with that framework in mind, we decided to try a different path, a path rooted in the very pragmatic calculation that we could provide more access to more information to more Chinese citizens more reliably by offering a new service – Google.cn – that, though subject to Chinese self-censorship requirements, would have some significant advantages. Above all, it would be faster and more reliable, and would provide more and better search results for all but a handful of politically sensitive subjects. We also developed several elements that distinguish our service in China, including:

Disclosure to users — We will give notification to Chinese users whenever search results have been removed.
Protection of user privacy — We will not maintain on Chinese soil any services, like email, that involve personal or confidential data. This means that we will not, for example, host Gmail or Blogger, our email and blogging tools, in China.
Continued availability of Google.com — We will not terminate the availability of our unfiltered Chinese-language Google.com service.
Many, if not most, of you here know that one of Google’s corporate mantras is “Don’t be evil.” Some of our critics – and even a few of our friends – think that phrase arrogant, or naïve or both. It’s not. It’s an admonition that reminds us to consider the moral and ethical implications of every single business decision we make.

We believe that our current approach to China is consistent with this mantra. Our hope is that our mix of measures, though far from our ideal, would accomplish more for Chinese citizens’ access to information than the alternative. We don’t pretend that this is the single “right” answer to the dilemma faced by information companies in China, but rather a reasonable approach that seems likely to bring our users greater access to more information than any other search engine in China. And by serving our users better, we hope it will be good for our business, too, over the long run.

To be clear, these are not easy, black-and-white issues. As our co-founder Sergey Brin has said, we understand and respect the perspective of people who disagree with our decision; indeed, we recognize that the opposing point of view is a reasonable one to hold. Nonetheless, in a situation where there are only imperfect options, we think we have made a reasonable choice. It’s a choice that has generated enormous attention – vastly more, indeed, than our earlier decisions not to cross the line of self-censorship. We hope that the ensuing dialogue will lead to productive collaboration among businesses and governments to further our shared aim of expanding access to information worldwide.

We think we have made a reasonable decision, though we cannot be sure it will ultimately be proven to be the best one. With the announcement of our launch of Google.cn, we’ve begun a process that we hope will better serve our Chinese users. We also hope that we will be able to add new services, if circumstances permit. We are also aware that, for any number of reasons, this may not come to pass. Looking ahead, we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives I’ve outlined above, we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China.

In the remainder of my written testimony below, I set forth the situation in China as we see it, the debate over the options we confronted, the substance of what Google has decided to do there, the reasoning behind that decision, and some ideas for both industry and governmental actions that could make a useful contribution to the objective of expanding access to information in every corner of the globe.

The Big Picture: The Internet is Transforming China

The backdrop to Google’s decision to launch Google.cn is the explosive growth of the Internet in China. To put it simply, the Internet is transforming China for the better. And the weight of the evidence suggests that the Internet is accelerating and deepening these positive trends, even in an imperfect environment.

Viewed broadly, information and communication technology – including the Internet, email, instant messaging, web logs, bulletin boards, podcasts, peer-to-peer applications, streaming audio and video, mobile telephones, SMS text messages, MMS photo-sharing, and so on – has brought Chinese citizens a greater ability to read, discuss, publish and communicate about a wider range of topics, events, and issues than ever before.

There are currently more than 105 million Internet users in China.1 Nearly half of them have access to broadband connections – an increase of 41% since 2003.2 Even so, Internet deployment in China is at a very early stage, reaching only about 8% of the population.3 Among those under 24 years of age, more than 80% are Internet users.4 By 2010, China will have more than 250 million Internet users.5 And already, there are more than 350 million mobile phones, a number growing by roughly 57 million annually.6

A recent and well-respected study by researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) documents some interesting, and perhaps surprising, findings about the views of Chinese Internet users:7

Most Chinese Internet users believe that the Internet is changing politics in China. Internet users tend to agree that it will increase political transparency and expand discourse: 63% believe that citizens will learn more about politics by going online, 54% of users believe the Internet provides more opportunities for criticizing the government, and 45% believe that the Internet provides more opportunities to express political views.
Large majorities of Chinese believe that certain kinds of Internet content, including pornography and violence, should be controlled. However, only 7.6% believe that political content on the Internet should be controlled.
By a 10:1 margin, Chinese Internet users believe that the Internet will make the world a better, rather than worse, place.
Based on its results, the CASS Internet Survey concludes that “the political impact of the Internet is more significant than it is in other countries. The impact can be seen not only in the relationship between government and citizens but also among people who share similar political interests. Thus, we can predict that as Internet becomes more popular in China, the impact on politics will be stronger.”8

The Problem: Access to Google in China is Slow and Unreliable

Since 2000, Google has been offering a Chinese-language version of Google.com, designed to make Google just as easy, intuitive, and useful to Chinese-speaking users worldwide as it is for speakers of English. Within China, however, Google.com has proven to be both slow and unreliable. Indeed, Google’s users in China struggle with a service that is often unavailable. According to our measurements, Google.com appears to be unreachable around 10% of the time. Even when Chinese users can get to Google.com, the website is slow (sometimes painfully so, and nearly always slower than our local competitors), and sometimes produces results that, when clicked on, stall out the user’s browser. The net result is a bad user experience for those in China.

The cause of the slowness and unreliability appears to be, in large measure, the extensive filtering performed by China’s licensed Internet Service Providers (ISPs). China’s laws, regulations, and policies against illegal information apply not only to the Internet content providers, but also to the ISPs. China has nine licensed international gateway data carriers, and many hundreds of smaller local ISPs. Each ISP is legally obligated to implement its own filtering mechanisms, leading to diverse and sometimes inconsistent outcomes across the network at any given moment. For example, some of Google’s services appear to be unavailable to Chinese users nearly always, including Google News, the Google cache (i.e., our service that maintains stored copies of web pages), and Blogspot (the site that hosts weblogs of Blogger customers). Other services, such as Google Image Search, can be reached about half the time. Still others, such as Google.com, Froogle, and Google Maps, are unavailable only around 10% of the time.

Even when Google is reachable, the data indicates that we are almost always slower than our local competitors. Third-party measurements of latency (meaning the delay that a user experiences when trying to download a web page) suggest that the average total time to download a Google webpage is more than seven times slower than for Baidu, the leading Chinese search engine.

Users trying to get to Google will have different experiences at different times of day, and from different points on the Chinese network. For example, access to Google appears to be speedier and more reliable in Beijing than in Shanghai, and generally better in the largest cities compared to smaller towns, suburbs, and villages.

Based on our analysis of the available data, we believe that the filtering performed by the international gateway ISPs is far more disruptive to our services than that performed by smaller local ISPs. Because Google’s servers have, to date, been located exclusively outside China, all traffic to and from Google must traverse at least one of China’s international gateway ISPs. Accordingly, Google’s access problems can only be solved by creating a local presence inside China.

Operating without a local presence, Google’s slowness and unreliability appears to have been a major – perhaps the major – factor behind our steadily declining market share. According to third-party estimates, Baidu has gone from 2.5% of the search market in 2003 to 46% in 2005, while Google has dropped to below 30% (and falling).9 The statistics are even more dire among the college-age young, who use Baidu even more, and Google less, than their elders. Part of this has been due to improvements in Baidu’s services and a major marketing campaign (funded by the proceeds of its successful IPO in the US), but the leading cause seems to be the Chinese users’ annoyance at the persistent slowness and unreliability of Google.

Google’s Calibrated Approach

In light of the chronic access problems that have plagued Google in China, Google’s management set out more than a year ago to study and learn about China, to understand and assess our options, to debate their relative merits, and to make a decision that properly weighs both business and ethical considerations.

There is no question that, as a matter of business, we want to be active in China. It is a huge, rapidly growing, and enormously important market, and our key competitors are already there. It would be disingenuous to say that we don’t care about that because, of course, we do. We are a business with stockholders, and we want to prosper and grow in a highly competitive world.

At the same time, acting ethically is a core value for our company, and an integral part of our business culture. Our slowness and unreliability has meant that Google is failing in its mission to make the world’s information accessible and useful to Chinese Internet users. Only a local presence would allow Google to resolve most, if not all, of the latency and access issues. But to have a local presence in China would require Google to get an Internet Content Provider license, triggering a set of regulatory requirements to filter and remove links to content that is considered illegal in China.

So we were confronted with two basic options – [1] stay out of China, or [2] establish a local presence in China – either of which would entail some degree of inconsistency with our corporate mission. In assessing these options, we looked at three fundamental Google commitments:

(a) Satisfy the interests of users,
(b) Expand access to information, and
(c) Be responsive to local conditions.

The strongest argument for staying out of China is simply that Google should not cross the line of self-censorship, and should not be actively complicit in imposing any limits on access to information. To be clear, the persistence of severe access problems amid fierce competition from local alternatives suggests that the consequence of this approach would be the steady shrinking of Google’s market share ever closer to zero. Without meaningful access to Google, Chinese users would rely exclusively on Internet search engines that may lack Google’s fundamental commitment to maximizing access to information – and, of course, miss out on the many features, capabilities, and tools that only Google provides.

On the other hand, we believe that even within the local legal and regulatory constraints that exist in China, a speedy, reliable Google.cn service will increase overall access to information for Chinese Internet users. We noted, for example, that the vast majority of Internet searches in China are for local Chinese content, such as local news, local businesses, weather, games and entertainment, travel information, blogs, and so forth. Even for political discussions, Chinese users are much more interested in local Chinese Internet sites and sources than from abroad. Indeed, for Google web search, we estimate that fewer than 2% of all search queries in China would result in pages from which search results would be unavailable due to filtering.

Crucial to this analysis is the fact that our new Google.cn website is an additional service, not a replacement for Google.com in China. The Chinese-language Google.com will remain open, unfiltered and available to all Internet users worldwide.

At the same time, the speed and technical excellence of Google.cn means that more information will be more easily searchable than ever before. Even with content restrictions, a fast and reliable Google.cn is more likely to expand Chinese users’ access to information.

We also took steps that went beyond a simple mathematical calculus about expanding access to information. First, we recognize that users are also interested in transparency and honesty when information has been withheld. Second, users are concerned about the privacy, security, and confidentiality of their personal information. Finally, users want to have competition and choices, so that the market players have a strong incentive to improve their offerings over time.
Transparency. Users have an interest in knowing when potentially relevant information has been removed from their search results. Google’s experience dealing with content restrictions in other countries provided some crucial insight as to how we might operate Google.cn in a way that would give modest but unprecedented disclosure to Chinese Internet users.

Google has developed a consistent global policy and technical mechanism for handling content deemed illegal by a host government. Several of the countries in which we operate have laws that regulate content.In all of these countries, Google responds similarly. First, when we get a court order or legal notice in a foreign country where we operate, we remove the illegal content only from the relevant national version of the Google search engine (such as Google.fr for France). Second, we provide a clear notice to users on every search results page from which one or more links has been removed. The disclosure allows users to hold their legal systems accountable.

This response allows Google to be respectful of local content restrictions while providing meaningful disclosure to users and strictly limiting the impact to the relevant Google website for that country. For China, this model provided some useful guidance for how we could handle content restrictions on Google.cn in way that would afford some disclosure when links have been removed.

Privacy and Security. Google is committed to protecting consumer privacy and confidentiality. Prior to the launch of Google.cn, Google conducted intensive reviews of each of our services to assess the implications of offering it directly in China. We are always conscious of the fact that data may be subject to the jurisdiction of the country where it is physically stored. With that in mind, we concluded that, at least initially, only a handful of search engine services would be hosted in China.

We will not store data somewhere unless we are confident that we can meet our expectations for the privacy and security of users’ sensitive information. As a practical matter, meeting this user interest means that we have no plans to host Gmail, Blogger, and a range of other such services in China.

Competition and Choice. Internet users in China, like people everywhere, want competition and choices in the marketplace. Without competition, companies have little incentive to improve their services, advance the state of the art, or take innovative risks. If Google were to stay out of China, it would remove powerful pressure on the local players in the search engine market to create ever-more-powerful tools for accessing and organizing information. Google’s withdrawal from China would cede the terrain to the local Internet portals that may not have the same commitment, or feel the competitive pressure, to innovate in the interests of their users.

The Decision: What Google Is Doing in China

The deliberative process and analysis outlined above led to the following decisions.

(1) Launch Google.cn.
We have recently launched Google.cn, a version of Google’s search engine that we will filter in response to Chinese laws and regulations on illegal content. This website will supplement, and not replace, the existing, unfiltered Chinese-language interface on Google.com. That website will remain open and unfiltered for Chinese-speaking users worldwide.

(2) Disclosure of Filtering
Google.cn presents to users a clear notification whenever links have been removed from our search results in response to local laws and regulations in China. We view this a step toward greater transparency that no other company has done before.

(3) Limit Services
Google.cn today includes basic Google search services, together with a local business information and map service. Other products – such as Gmail and Blogger, our blog service – that involve personal and confidential information will be introduced only when we are comfortable that we can provide them in a way that protects the privacy and security of users’ information.

Next Steps: Voluntary Industry Action

Google supports the idea of Internet industry action to define common principles to guide the practices of technology firms in countries that restrict access to information. Together with colleagues at other leading Internet companies, we are actively exploring the potential for guidelines that would apply for all countries in which Internet content is subjected to governmental restrictions. Such guidelines might encompass, for example, disclosure to users, protections for user data, and periodic reporting about governmental restrictions and the measures taken in response to them.

Next Steps: U.S. Government Action

The United States government has a role to play in contributing to the global expansion of free expression. For example, the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce and the office of the U.S. Trade Representative should continue to make censorship a central element of our bilateral and multilateral agendas.

Moreover, the U.S. government should seek to bolster the global reach and impact of our Internet information industry by placing obstacles to its growth at the top of our trade agenda. At the risk of oversimplification, the U.S. should treat censorship as a barrier to trade, and raise that issue in appropriate fora.
________________________________

1 “China Online Search Market Survey Report,” China Network Information Center (CNNIC) (August 2005) (“CNNIC Search Engine Study”).

2 Guo Liang, “Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Five Chinese Cities,” Research Center for Social Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (November 2005) (“the CASS Internet Survey”), at iii. The CASS Internet Survey is a statistically rigorous survey of Internet users in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Changsha.

3 Id.

4 Id., at iv.

5 “15th Statistic Survey Report on the Internet Development in China,” China Network Information Center (CNNIC) (2005).

6 From statistics published by China’s Ministry of Information Industry.

7 CASS Internet Survey., at iv-ix, 93-100.

8 Id. at 100.

9 CNNIC Search Engine Study.

曾子墨：等了非常长的时间，今天我们终于等到了这样的机会，下面请大家用热烈的掌声来欢迎李敖先生，以及清华大学人文社会科学院院长李强先生和凤凰卫视董事局主席兼行政总裁刘长乐先生走上主席台。

从清华大学师生们的掌声中大家已经感受到非常热情的欢迎的气氛，作为主人家的代表，此时此刻清华大学人文社会科学学院院长李强先生要为我们致一段欢迎辞，有请李强先生。

李强：尊敬的李敖先生，尊敬的刘长乐先生，尊敬的各位来宾，老师们，同学们，大家上午好。

为了把更多的时间留给演讲会，我只讲三点：第一，非常欢迎李敖先生作客清华并发表演讲。李敖先生涉猎广泛，此次，清华师生能有机会与李敖先生面对面交流，我相信，这对双方都颇有益处。我也希望李敖先生在清华的演讲会对弘扬中华文化，对促进海峡两岸的交流和统一产生积极的影响。

第二，感谢刘长乐先生和凤凰卫视，因为他们的努力，使得本期世界大讲堂特别节目能够安排在清华。以往清华师生只能在电视上和书本上看李敖，听李敖，读李敖，此次有了面对面直接交流的机会，这很有意义。李敖先生阔别56年之后，重返大陆，此次神州文化之旅使得他能够有机会直接的看大陆，听大陆，读大陆。相信，他对大陆的了解也会更加全面、准确、深刻。

最后，祝愿李敖先生的神州文化之旅取得圆满成功。

曾子墨：非常感谢李强院长的第一二三，此时此刻，各位老师，各位同学和我一样都在期待着世纪大讲堂的这期特别节目，首先请李强先生以及刘长乐先生在台下就坐，谢谢两位！

今天的大讲堂我们为大家请来一位特殊的嘉宾，说他特殊，首先因为他有着多重的身份，他是历史学家、还是作家，还是台湾的立法委员。说他特殊，还因为他阔别了大陆56年之后第一次，回到北京，他说他不希望自己被当做是一个客人，他不过是一个归队的老同志。而且说他特殊，因为他在公众心目中的形象，最近有一个调查就显示，在大陆，有4成以上的网友都认为，他是狂人。今天来到我们的大讲堂我们这个归队的老同志到底有什么样的话来说？下面我们用热烈的掌声欢迎李敖先生为我们演讲。

李敖：刚才被美女抱了一下，浑身发热，我可以脱外衣吗？你们各位也可以宽衣，因为这屋好象热了一点，不要客气，不要见怪。

毛泽东主席说，辛亥革命没有完成，但我到了贵校以后，发现真的没有完成，这不是大清帝国吗？大清帝国在清华，这说起来有点政治性的含义，我已经听到大陆的一句话，叫做大清帝国北大荒。刚刚我已经被嘱咐，不要奚落北大，所以今天虽然我在清华，我决定放北大一马。

各位，就在三年七个月以前，美国帝国主义的总统布什就站在这儿向大家说了一个谎话，大家看到布什的讲演稿没有？他说，清华大学是美国支持下建立的，等于是美国捐赠的。他说，清华大学是透过我国（美国）赞助建立的，布什总统讲了一句谎话。

大家想想看，当年一群爱国的中国人，可是他们给我们国家闯了祸，就是义和团，闹着八国联军，八国联军到今天只有一个奥匈帝国没有了，其他七个国家还在，尤其是那个可恶的小日本都在，当时八国联军以后，叫中国人赔钱，中国人赔不起钱。我们以甲午战争做例子，中国人赔日本人，赔的是两年全国的总收入，相当于日本三年的全国总收入，中国人赔垮了，所以日本小孩子用中国人的钱受了很好的教育，中国人没有钱办教育。到了八国联军的时候，要赔钱，美国也开出价码来，说我很客气，你们赔我军费就好了，结果账单开出来以后被一个聪明的中国人发现了，这个人叫做梁成，是当时驻美国的公使，相当于大使。他就仔细算这笔军费，发现美国人多算了两倍半，梁成就很聪明地向美国的国务卿海约翰商量说，你们既然说是要赔军费，怎么可以报出来这么多，多了两倍半，美国人又爱里子又爱面子，搞得国务卿很不好意思，说怎么办？聪明的中国大使梁成说，钱捐出来好不好？办一个大学好不好？后来美国人就同意了，这就是今天的清华大学。所以清华大学钱的来源是因为美国人故意冒领钱，被我们逮到被我们追回，今天又愣又笨又凶又恨的美国总统小布什，居然说是他们送给我们的大学，当然，我要撕他的讲稿，大家觉得我做得对吗？

我们中国在过去一直有觉得有外国人，为什么我们盖长城呢？盖长城就是挡外国人，挡胡人，各代都挡，现在长城说起来不是秦始皇的长城，也不是孟姜女哭倒的长城，它是以一个旧的为根据盖出来的一个新城。可是我们想到，隔了半天，发现隔了这些人，到了和英国人1840年、1842年打仗的时候，才发现那是真正的外国人，过去长城挡的，或者东征西讨打的这些人都是自己人，到了英国人出来以后，我们才知道什么是真的外国人。那个时候我们出现了一个民族英雄就是林则徐，鸦片战争以后，林则徐被定了罪，给他发配新疆，在路上林则徐写了一封秘密的信给他的好朋友说，和英国人打仗，关公岳飞出来都束手无策，他们都没有办法，为什么？他说我们看不见敌人，敌人就打到了我们，为什么？他们有大炮，我们绝对打不过他们。他说，可是我写给你这个真相的这封信不能发表，发表以后，大家说我林则徐不爱国，这个真相一出来，会影响我整个的名誉，所以这件事情用我们北京话说起来，就是要把它密下来，不能讲。为什么发生这个现象？因为真的发现洋人来了，我们真打不过他，这时候中国就一路挨打。中国面临两个问题，就是如何避免挨打和挨饿，如何避免挨打？经过这么多年下来，最后香港也收回了，现在没有人敢打我们中国了，我在这里公开和大家说，只有一个党能够做到这个现象，就是中国共产党。

大家以为我喜欢骂人，不晓得我也喜欢捧人，该属于谁的就是属于谁的，我必须说刚才这个结论是正确的。刚刚有人说了你在北京这样讲，大家忘了我在中国的一部分台北也是这样讲的，告诉大家这个功劳是共产党的。我们的确富强起来了，当时穷的时候，日本人奚落我们的外交部长陈毅，说你们中国人穷得裤子都没有穿的，你们还要造原子弹，虎虎有生气的陈毅外长说，我们光着屁股，没有裤子穿也要造原子弹，我觉得这个气势是很了不起的。可是谈到没有穿，这件事情是真的还是假的？是真的，要不要怪共产党？我们把帐要算一算。

大家记得不记得唐朝的诗，来抓兵了，壮丁跑掉了，老头子也跑掉了，三个儿子也被抓走了，家里面剩下老太太，她和抓兵的这些官说，我家里没有人，”室内更无人”，只有吃奶的孙子、吃奶孙子的妈妈还在，不能见你们，为什么？因为没有裤子穿，没有裙子穿，”室中更无人，唯有乳下孙。有孙母未去，出入无完裙”，各位，中国人没裤子穿从唐朝就开始了，叫共产党负责任负到唐朝未免远了点。

我看过30年前的一个高高，一群人到甘肃去考察农业，大家口渴了，到农家要水喝，进了农家以后，农民很客气地招待他，他们在喝水的时候看到床上有一个棉被，棉被底下人在动，他们很好奇，就问这位农夫，说有人在睡觉吗？农夫说，没有睡觉，那说没有睡觉蒙着棉被干什么？农夫说，不瞒你们说，她是我女儿，你们是客人，她不能出来，她没有裤子穿。

这没有裤子穿的事我到处听说，台湾有我一个好朋友李清华，他的爸爸就是李患，在党政府里面做过”行政院长”，他亲口告诉我们，在西北行军的时候家里只有一条裤子，看到农夫出来，家里人都在家里面光着屁股，农夫的老婆出来裤子给她穿，农夫在家里光着屁股。我们中国是这么穷，这个账不能算在共产党头上。可是我们必须说，从1949年以后有账目我们要和共产党说，共产党是不是要负责，可是49年共产党所接受的摊子是什么摊子？是国民党，国民党把能带走的全带到台湾走了。我太总了500本书，国民党带走了全中国国库里的黄金，当时的黄金折成美金是3亿美金，现在不算什么，可是当时是全中国的钱，国民党把这个钱带走了，能带走的全带走了。

大家看到莎士比亚的剧本，那个皇帝最后要跑的时候就讲了一句话，说一匹马，一匹马，我整个的王权用它来换一匹马，因为只有一匹马能够救他的命，国民党最后跑的时候能拿走的全拿走了，留给中国大陆的是一穷二白，国库掏空了，能破坏的桥都炸掉了，能带走的东西全部带走了，并且留下了300万的坏分子捣乱，土匪、国特留下在了大陆，所以引起共产党的紧张，又穷又要解决这些治安的问题，我们是在这种情况下成长的，今天大家知道吗，现在是中国自汉唐以来所没有的一个盛世。

我在中学时候写文章批评一个教授，他后来写信，他很谦虚地给我回信，这个教授你们都不认识，可是他给中国大陆，给北京大学留下了一个有趣的记录，就是”未名湖”三个字是他起的名字，这个人叫钱穆。他常常讲的一句话就是”汉唐以来所未有也”，汉朝唐朝以来从来没有的事情，他希望这个局面出现，今天告诉各位，我李敖亲眼看到了。

大家要知道，我们取得这么一点点的成绩，付出了多少代价呢？不但是千万人头落地，而且是多少愚昧的代价我们付出来了。在鸦片战争的时候，中国有名的思想家死掉了，他的名字叫余振界，他是替中国妇女受到不人道的待遇讲话的。他写了一篇文章说外国人什么样子，他说，外国人的生理结构和我们中国人是不一样的，他说中国人的心有七个窍，洋鬼子只有四个窍，我们中国人的肺只有六片，洋鬼子只有四片，我们中国人的睾丸有两个，洋鬼子有四个。所以，大家想想看，中国第一流的思想家在鸦片战争刚开始的时候，对外国人的了解是这样子的可怜和单薄，所以真正打起仗来的时候我们打不过它，所以我们尽各种方法和洋鬼子和他们周旋，可是我们所得到的都是打败打败，屈辱屈辱。到了后来，1949年终于到了，中华人民共和国成立了，穷是我们最大的一个威胁，当时一个笑话，苏联关系还好的时候，当时有一个笑话挖苦毛泽东和苏联的统治者赫鲁晓夫说，老赫鲁晓夫给我们粮食，我们穷，没有粮食，给我们面包，赫鲁晓夫回电给毛泽东说，毛同志，没有粮食，你们只好拿勒紧裤腰带，毛主席第二个电报打给赫鲁晓夫说，请送给裤腰带来。

大家说我的掌声没有连战多，因为我讲得太精彩了，你们都来不及鼓掌了，我讲演很多次，可是我最怕这种讲堂，为什么？大家知道吗？因为它是个半圆形的，礼貌上我们要照顾每一个人，头要从左边到右边，右边到左边，就觉得自己像是一个电风扇。

报告刘老板讲到目前为止还安全吗？外面谣言说我和凤凰的情缘已尽。我告诉大家，胡扯！

当年，胡适先生在北京大学，当时北京大学有共产党和国民党的学生，当时为了一件事情在礼堂里面吵起来了。胡先生出现在礼堂的时候，共产党的学起来说，汉奸！指着胡适在骂。胡先生是教育家，心平气和苦口婆心说，这个房屋里面没有汉奸。

今天在我们的祖国大地上面，没有谁不爱中国，没有谁是要捣你的乱，和你过不去，乱出反动言论，影响民心士气。可是有的人说你们言论有问题，这就是邓小平同志所讲的，有些同志思想需要慢慢的改过来，我愿意等待！不过大家不要忘记，我已经年过70了，我已经等不久了，希望大家要改，要快一点。

各位，今天我和大家讲，大家都以为我是自由主义者，你到了北京，过去你骂国民党，你骂民进党，你骂老美，你骂小日本，你到了北京，你敢不敢骂共产党？我会问我自己，我敢不敢骂共产党？我该不该骂共产党？

我告诉各位，如果有可骂之处我会骂，大家发现我不但没有骂共产党，我现在放弃了我自己的东西，就是自由主义。大家觉得太奇怪了，你李敖说自己是自由主义者，我的朋友都说我李敖是自由主义者，为什么你今天会放弃自由主义者呢？我告诉大家，我不和大家谈学理，谈学理17世纪、18世纪，19世纪关于自由主义的著作我们用俗话来说也是汗牛充栋。

现在我只谈两个部分，北京大学部分我没有讲得详细，第一个，自由主义是”反求诸己”，我自己心灵能够开放，不被那些思想所困，这是我能够解脱，这是一种对我自己的一种改革开放，有这个本领，这才是自由主义者，对自己负责。另外一半是和政府的关系，和政府的关系最有趣的，最逗的是什么？自由主义从17世纪、18世纪到20世纪大家所争取的自由是什么，那些东西都是虚无缥渺的，没有很明确的出现。

我告诉大家，自由和爱情一样，都要列举的，大家记得不记得英国的女诗人布朗宁她有一句古诗说，怎么爱你，让我一件一件数出来，我爱你眼睛，爱你鼻子，爱你耳朵。像印度的诗人泰戈尔，他喜欢女人脸上的麻子。陀思妥耶夫斯基爱女人的脚指头。在比尔基死了100年之后，人们发现他的日记，发现她最喜欢的是女人的那个地方。每个人的爱都是列举的，自由都是列举的，过去我们翻译错了，翻成人权宣言，是错的，那个BILL（清单）。

我告诉大家有一个朋友描写我的话，说李敖真够朋友，对所有人都够朋友，绝不会先出卖朋友。爱情都要开清单，当自由主义被开清单的时候，大家注意，自由主义的理想都没有意义了。我们要跟着清单向政府要我们的自由，够了，它给我们以后，所有自由主义全部落实，全部兑现，清单在哪里？清单在《中华人民共和国法律汇编》的第一篇里，就是中华人民共和国的宪法，宪法里面给我们列了，比全世界任何国家给的都多。

我说一句给大家看，当我做政治犯的时候我们每天可以出来散步，每次只有10分钟，散步的时候会碰到一些其他的政治犯，其他的”牛鬼蛇神”。有一天我碰到一个17岁的小政治犯在那里东张西望，我说你什么罪状，他说是政治犯，我说怎么抓进来的，他说他组党，他说我在学校里面的公民教科书上面有一条节介绍中华民国宪法，第14条说人民有集会结社的自由，他说我以为那是真的，就组党了，就给逮进来了，后来小鬼自杀了。他以为是真的，就组党了。

大家注意了，《中华人民共和国宪法》里面所列举的，一条一条列举的，是全世界最完整的出版，言论自由，罢工自由，什么都有，每一条都列举出来了，我不以为他是假的，只要我们认真他就是真的。

美国的富兰克林，大家知道吗，他一生正好分成两段，前半生做生意、办报纸，放风筝；后半生革命。富兰克林是最怪的一个人，美国的诗人副若斯特讲，他说我年轻的时候不敢做一个激进派，怕我年老成保守派。结果富兰克林正好相反，他越老越激进，最后富兰克林变成美国的革命党，富兰克的儿子变成保守党，他的私生子是当年美国13州里面的一个州长，所以父子为之反目。

富兰克讲了一句话，非常动人，他说，哪里有自由，哪里就是我的祖国。告诉大家，富兰克林是错误的，这句话要被我李敖改写，怎么说，这里是我的国家，我要使它自由。别以为都是假的，当我们努力就是真的；别以为他们在骗我们，当我们认真，他们就不是骗子。

所以我对大家说，大家要有信心，在最好的时候建立我们的信心。所谓最好的时候，就是说今天每一个人都有裤子穿了，就是这个时候。大家不要笑，陈毅说，没有裤子穿也要搞原子弹的时候，当时我们中国人口10亿，10亿人口每个人给一双袜子穿，什么结果呢？就是一双袜子才1块美金，10亿人口大家穿上袜子就是10亿美金，10亿美金可以造两艘核子潜艇，使我们的国家强兵，挺起，洋鬼子不敢打我们。可是我们大家要光着脚，大家想想看，我们付了这个代价。

人民的看法和政治领导者，和国家领导人的看法有时候不一样的。美国林肯总统时代的国务卿听说当时属于俄国的阿拉斯加要卖，卖多少钱呢？卖720万美金，等于一亩地只要2分美金，他的花钱就把它买下来了。全国人都骂他，说你这个混蛋，买那个冰天雪地的地方干什么？那么多的钱，这个国务卿被骂得满头包。可是他讲了一句话，他说现在我把它买下来，也许多少年以后，我们的子孙因为买到这块地，而得到好处，这个好处是什么？我们不知道。今天证实了这句话，在20世纪飞弹飞来飞去的时候如果今天的阿拉斯加在苏联人的手里，苏联不需要制造长程飞弹，所以政治家的眼光和群众和老百姓是不一致的。老百姓是不了解的，老百姓是抱怨的，老百姓是愤怒的。过去在很穷困的一段时间发生了五大湖逃往潮，很多人从广州游泳到香港。有一个悲惨的故事，一对青年男女一起游泳朝香港游，游了一半，男朋友淹死了，这个女孩子抓住他男朋友的尸体继续往前游，她说我们要死也死在自由的地方。有这么一个故事被外面人大肆宣传，我们平心静气的想，一对小夫妻在穷乡僻壤的小夫妻，为了他们的前途能够过好一点的生活，能够穿一双袜子，他们跑了，是可以原谅的，是人之常情的，我们不能说你不爱国，用三个字抹煞他一切。可是我们现在知道，当我们有一天觉得我们不往外面跑，自由不在外面，自由在我们眼前，经过我们的努力自由会实现的时候，为什么我们要跑？大家想一想。

提问：

主持人：谢谢李敖先生精彩的演讲，我们的声音都被淹没在大家热情洋溢的掌声中，接下来把提问的机会留在现场的同学。

提问：李敖先生您好，我是来自公共管理学院的学生，我觉得我们是以清华最热烈的双臂来拥抱您，欢迎您回到我们祖国的组织，欢迎您回来。

李敖：你这叫什么问题，我根本就没有离开。

提问：我相信通过刚刚短短几十分钟的讲演，我们非常深刻领略了您的语言风格和独特的人格魅力，可能我们更加喜爱您的是您对我们祖国的认同和您的爱国之情，我们真的感觉到您的拳拳之心。在这里我很关心的一个问题是，我们清华人不是自了派，我们很关心统一大业，对您这样一个爱国统一人士来讲，今天又是文化之旅，怎么样通过两岸的文化交流来推进祖国的统一大业，我相信您一定会有非常精彩的答案给我们。

李敖：你提了一个好问题，可是我提供一个笨答案，什么是笨答案？以你们清华大学这么聪明的学生，你们不知道这个答案吗？你们自己知道，故意来问我，叫我说话，让我闯祸。

提问：李敖先生您好，我是清华大学汽车工程系的学生，首先我想表达对您刚刚所谈的关于自由与个人努力的理论，非常钦佩。同时我也对您对台湾慰安妇的义举非常地钦佩，我的问题是，您一贯说是追求事实，戳穿谎言，我们都知道，台湾的三一九枪击案疑点重重，您提供的美国中央情报局的秘密证据也没有了下文，不知道这个案子的真相何在，您在这方面还会什么举动？

李敖：我提供的证据是有效的，陈水扁的证据在档案里，我的证据在人心里，为什么在人心里？大家想想看，陈水扁当时所说的三一九枪击案破案，是说一个人开了两枪从他的肚皮上打过去，叫一人一枪，两弹，整个的报告，整个的谎言都这样发展的。可是我所的美国中央情报局的报告是说，两个人、两把枪、两颗子弹，换句话说，多了一个凶手，并且说，那个凶手放了枪之后，是治安人员保护他脱离现场，表示说是陈水扁自己用他所谓”总统”的权力做的假。可是陈水扁他们匆匆结案，说没有这个事，就是一个答案，一人一枪两子弹就这样结案了，他结的案只在档案里，我们在人心里面，大家知道这个问题没有解决，大概是两人两枪两弹。

提问：李敖先生您好，我是来自清华大学材料系的同学，非常喜欢看您的《李敖有话说》节目，在这个节目里面，我经常看到您穿一件红色的外衣，那么今天您为什么没有穿，这件外衣对您来说是有什么特殊的含义？

李敖：舍不得穿，怕穿坏了，没有了。

提问：李敖先生您好，我是公共管理学院的硕士研究生，从您今天早晨的演讲，能够感受到您深深的爱国情结。我知道北大对李敖先生这次演讲十分重视，也非常热情友好，但是李敖先生你用了”孬”字来描述北大的现状，”孬”在北京话中是一个非常严重的贬义词，我觉得对主人不够礼貌，也不够尊重，我不知道李敖先生有没有想过，是否愿意在清华讲台上对北大表示歉意？谢谢！

李敖：我想不到来清华还有北大卧底的，我在北京念中学的时候听到一句谚语叫做北大老，师大穷，只有清华可通融。因为北大老，所以我们要使劲扎它一下，因为扎它，所以用字用词就难免重了一点。我想和大家说，这57年来，我回来了，大家说，乡音未改，我告诉你，我没改，改的是你们，为什么？我在北京的时候是个小型的北京，我住在北京城里面大圈里面的小圈里面，小圈里面的黄圈，住在黄城里面，现在的圈大了，三环四环五环都有了。我们过去在北京讲的话就很纯的北京话，现在你们的话和我们混在一起了，这个语言混同改变是进步是退步？我告诉你是进步。台湾人到了北京，你们一听他是台湾人，讲的国语，为什么？用的词和你们不一样，为什么不一样？我举个例子，我们喊疼，你打我一拳就喊疼死了，山东人会说”份儿”（音），就表示疼，懂我意思吗？语言改变了。好比说，我李敖如果披个外衣夜里从小巷子出来看到女生过来拥抱，北京的女孩子说，呀，台湾女孩子说，哇，或者说哇噻，或者说，那么小，反应不一样。所以今天我用了这个字来挖苦北京大学，我愿意委托你向北京大学道歉。

提问：您不愿意作为一个客人，我想再次欢迎您自家人回到北京来到清华。首先我想给您说两件事情，可能您会比较高兴一点，第一件事情刚刚您说美国在当时和清华校方有一个秘密的协定，有80％和20％之说，我想和您说的是在那几十年没有听美国鬼子的，包括您肯定知道的王国维这些国学四大导师以及稍后的钱钟书，您知道这个应该会比较高兴。第二点您可能比较高兴，您说到钱穆先生，虽然钱穆先生没有给清华像北大一样的未名湖，我和您说清华的学生也非常尊敬钱穆先生，不但知道他，而且非常尊敬他，至少我和我的同学在我们的音乐素养课上就曾经得到间接来自钱穆先生的教会。我的问题是，您一直把自己定义为一个陆的学者，而且您非常著名的也是一颗卷全的爱国之心，现在我们非常担忧的是，在提出岛内当局推行的是趋中国化的教育，这对于年轻人的影响是非常大的，而年轻人是台湾的未来，他们将是台湾以后主要的公民和政治的决策者，您觉得，怎么样能够在文化上反对这个文化台独，因为文化上的分离才会是永远的分离？

李敖：我女儿四岁的时候，她的逻辑思维非常，她有一天跟我说，妈妈骂我，我不喜欢妈妈，爸爸我喜欢你，你抱我，大家知道逻辑程序吗？骂我是叙述情况，”我不喜欢妈妈”，是展开统战，就是划清界线，第三个是”爸爸我喜欢你”，是战还统战，”爸爸抱我”是提出要求，这是共产党干的事情。你们也不要笑，那种该与是完全失败，事实上对我李敖说起来很多教育也是失败的，你叫我站在这儿讲我中学所学的课程，你叫我全部讲出来，讲不到一时就讲光了，所以基本上靠教科书是不好的。在这里我要赞美我的儿子，我的儿子叫李戡，国民党动乱戡乱的时候停止了，我的儿子叫做李戡，第一流聪明的小鬼，他的逻辑性也好得不得了，他跟着我的真传看课外书，学校里面能够混过去就算了，唯一的缺点就是考不上清华大学而已。

提问：李敖先生您好，我们中国人好像讲究传统为人处世之道中庸内敛含蓄的风格，而您是非常张扬外露，您是怎么看出这两种风格的？

李敖：我是和孔子学的，这就中国人的传统，动肝火，讽刺人，当面说好话，背后下毒手。

提问：李敖先生您好，我是来自机械系的同学，我和我同学挺喜欢您主持节目的风格，都知道您嘻笑怒骂的风格给您带来很大的名气，但是有时候您犀利不留情面的丰富也使您失去很多支持者，作为一名喜欢您的年轻人，我想问一下您有没有反思过自己，还有一些什么缺点，或者是有哪一些不足？

李敖：你又拿孔子来逼我，孔子说，秋有形，我很有福气，因为我有错的是，全世界都知道，这不是孔子吗？谢谢你。我告诉你，我自己有所反省，可是我和你们说，有时候忍不住，自己有那种虫，要张狂，要显摆，的确是有，可是在我内心深处冷静得不得了，非常地务实，尤其是数钱的时候。

提问：李敖先生您好，我是来自汽车工程系的硕士研究生，刚刚您提到汉唐盛世，非常荣幸我来自陕西省，汉唐在我们西安。我想请问您在您的节目中好像有一句词，说您愿意做一个唐朝人，我想问您对所谓汉唐盛世有自己的见解和观点吗？

李敖：你可能有一个误会，我没有说我宁愿做一个唐朝人，我只说除非我碰到武则天，我不愿意做唐朝人。

提问：李敖先生您好，欢迎您到大陆来，非常荣幸能够得到这样一次向您提问的机会。李大师虽然把它称为李敖神州文化之旅，但是您在海峡两岸都有一定影响力的政治人物，您谈您此行的政治目的？

李敖：你把我谈得太小了，我觉得谈政治问题太小了，政治真的是一时的，可是文化是永久的。我在台湾做大学生的时候，碰到有一次当年南开大学的教授，也是近代史的一个学者该作蒋庭副讲了一句话，也是提到一个问题，他说汉武帝伟大，还是司马迁伟大？结论是，司马迁伟大，为什么？汉武帝虽然折腾了一辈子，不可一世，可是他死了以后什么都没有，可是司马迁和他的《史记》和他悲惨人生故事一直流传到今天。

提问：我们在2001年的时候曾经在中央台参加过一个CCTV4和您连线的节目，当年您说您从来不用电脑是不是现在还不用电脑？在今天电脑时代，在网络上得到信息是非常丰富的，它可以给人很多非常重要的数据库和资料，您觉得电脑时代会不会对您的文化思考方式产生什么样的影响？孔子不用电脑，是因为那时候没有电脑，您就不用拿孔子比？

李敖：我儿子帮我用。其实我觉得用电脑的人蛮可怜的，因为他接收了大量的资讯，排山倒海涌来，你要花很好的头脑才能从这些大量的资讯里面能够把它坚出来，如果没有很好的头脑，这些东西是害人的，所以我认为爱因斯坦的那句话想象力比知识还重要，现在已经不发生知识的问题，我觉得现在人类平等最重要的特色就是在知识取得方面非常的平等，我们可以花很少的钱，从电脑里面取得知识，过去好难，美国总统问而讯要走那么多路去借一本圣经，林垦小时候什么书都没有只有一本圣经，他们取得资讯是非常男的，可是现在我们电脑一打开，那么多资料出现，我怀疑你们的小头脑负荷得了，所以我才说快速的辨别能力，知道什么是好的知识，什么是臭狗屎的分别是非常重要的。